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DISCUSSION 
P4C ought to nourish moral development 
Aside from its capacity to nourish "skilled" thinking (the narrow  view 
of "critical thinking"\ it  has   been  theorised   by   manl that, 
Philosophy  for Children  - or P4C as it is often fondly referred to - ought 
also to nourish good thinking in the moral sense (the "deeper" view of 
critical thinking).  That is, it has been theorised that youngsters  who 
partake in a Philosophy  for Children   program  over an extended  period 
of time ought to become better people as well as better thinkers. 
 
There are a number of reasons why one would predict that this ought to 
be the case. The first thing that comes to mind is the content of the pro- 
gram, i.e., philosophy.  Since philosophical inquiry so often focuses on 
value issues, it offers participants  the opportunity  to objectively (i.e., 
without bias) discuss the difficulties, consequences, benefits, and ratio- 
nale of adopting any given value in any given situation. In so doing, P4C 
helps participants create a comprehensive  picture of the sort of people 
they want to be and the kind of world  they want to live in.   As well, 
since such discussions serve as  "moral practice," i.e., youngsters experi- 
ence in their imagination the consequences of choosing out of various al- 
ternative courses of action - P4C ought also to ensure that, when push 
comes to shove, those values will in fact mould behaviour. 
 
As impressive as analyses of  such value issues would seem to be, it can 
be argued  that, paradoxically, it is the "value neutral"  process, i.e., 
participation in a Community of  Inquiry, which contributes most 
powerfully to moral development (though the content uniquely energises 
the process
3
>.  The principal reason why participation in a Community of 
Inquiry can be expected to fuel such development is that participants (i) 
are  chronically  exposed  to  the  points of view of others,  and  (ii) 
inevitably  come   to  view  others'  perspectives as  an   invaluable 
contribution to understanding the complexity of any issue, i.e., 
perspective-taking is chronically positively reinforced. 
 
Perspective-taking:a developmental model 
In terms of a developmental  continuum,  the initial or most  primitive 
position of an individual's  perspective-taking capacity can be described 
- using one of Piaget's terms
4  
-as "egocentric," i.e., viewing the world 
strictly from one's own point of view. In theory the opposite pole is held 
down  by the regulative ideal of being able to view any given situation 
from an  infinite  number  of perspectives,  i.e., a God's  eye  view.    In 
between  these two poles, again in concurrence with Piaget's  theory of 
cognitive   development, it can  be  presumed   that  the  capacity   for 
perspective-taking -or what is sometimes referred to as differentiation 
- grows in a stepwise progression. 
 
Given this cognitive developmental  model and given the assumptions 
about the dynamics of the Community  of Inquiry, one would predict that 
long term  participation  in a Community of Inquiry   ought   to facilitate 
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both  the  capacity  and  the  propensity   of  participants to  take  into 
account even greater number of viewpoints at any one time when 
attempting  to think through complex issues.  It is this assumption  that 
formed the foundational focus of this research project. 
 
The qualitative  impad of perspective-taking 
Being able to access many  points of view when making decisions in 
complex situations seems in and of itself a laudable goal. However, one 
could  argue that  studying the perspective-taking impact  of 
participation in a Community  of Inquiry,  per se, merely focuses on a 
necessary  rather  than sufficient condition of moral thought
5




one  could  argue  that an  individual  might access a large  number  of 
viewpoints but then not fairly take them into account when making 
decisions.   In terms of measuring  the "'deep" impact of Philosophy   for 
Children, therefore,   it is important  to attempt  to also measure the 
qualitative  changes in participants'  reasoning styles that are theorised 
to accompany increased perspective-taking. 
 
Developmental  literature is replete with theories on how increasing 
differentiation might have an impact on the qualitative  way that an 
individual  reasons.   The qualitative  styles and/or attitudes  that were 
the focus of this study were: 
1) the degree to which an individual is "self-protective"; 
2) degree of conformity; 
3) the degree to which an individual engages in principled thought, or 
what Kant referred to as "universalisation;" 
4) tolerance of ambiguity; 
5) external orientation; 
6) self-esteem 
 
There were three primary reasons for picking the six variables listed 
above. 
1) There   were  already   "objective"   questionnaires  available,  i.e., 
measurement  protocols, that could be easily and inexpensively marked 
6 
that purported  to measure these qualitative ways of thinking. 
2) These questionnaires had already  been independently  assessed  for 
reliability   and  validity. 
3) Their relation to perspective-taking is relatively transparent. 
 
I will briefly discuss point '3' i.e., the relationship of each of the above 
reasoning styles in relation to perspective-taking in turn. 
 
The first three styles of reasoning , i.e., self-protective, conformity, and 
principled  thought, can be discussed  together.   Together  they mirror 
major developmental  qualitative changes described bsuch renowned 
ego and  moral developmental  theorists as Loevinger7 and  Kohlberg
8
 
Both Loevinger and Kohlberg depict development as occurring in three 
broad steps (each having its own subdivision).  Individuals at the lower 
levels of development are described as having a "self-protective 
attitude." Loevinger describes the self-protective individual as one who 
is manipulative,  exploitive, and opportunistic; whose major concern is 
that of controli  who fears being caught and  who tends to externalise 
blame.  That these attitudes should cluster together at the bottom of the 
developmental  scale become self-explanatory once one presumes  that 
those in the initial stages of development suffer from a severely limited 
perspective of the world   If someone can not understand  the viewpoints 
of  others,   that. individual  will  obviously  have  a  correspondingly 
limited understanding of the actions and intentions of others, as wen as 
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a lack of predictive power.  Naturally such individuals  are concerned 
about control; naturally they will resort to manipulation and exploitive 
manoeuvres in the face of lack of overt power; naturally, interpersonal 
or social ignorance will fuel the tendency to extemalise blame. 
 
Loevinger, along with Kohlberg, argue that the middle step in develop- 
ment is characterised by conformity-- an attitude that requires that one 
at least be able to understand  the perspectives of one's reference group. 
Although conformist individuals must have superior perspective-taking 
abilities than those who are in the primary egocentric self-protective 
position, precisely because conformist individuals one can not see beyond 
the  perspective  of their reference group,  they tend  to think that  the 
dictates  of that group  are inviolable.   Goffman
9




conformists  that they 
... are likely to sense that their rules for participating in gatherings 
are crucial for society's well-being - that these rules are natural, 
inviolable, and fundamenta11y right.  (Thus) these persons will need 
some means of defending themselves against the doubts that are cast 
on these rules by persons who break them.... One way of correcting 
situational offences is to look upon the offender as someone who is 
unnatural, who is not quite  a  human  being, for  then  the offence 
becomes a reflection on him and not on what he had offended. 
 
Precisely because there is solidarity in numbers, it is often difficult for 
conformists to move out of their comfortable position to viewing issues 
from an even  wider, i.e., from a potentially  universal  point of view. 
"Universalisation" is the  prototypical   form  of moral  reasoning 10 11 
"Universalisation" refers to a process whereby one imaginatively  puts 
oneself in the place of every person who might be affected by one's act, 
in order  to determine whether, given one's reflective equilibrium
12   
one 
would still will that that act be carried out.   Clearly, in order to 
universalise, an individual needs to be able to take into account a large 
number of points of view at one and the same time.  Loevinger refers to 
persons who have reached a post-conformist stage of ego development as 
"conscientious."   She describes them as individuals  who have a deep 
concern for human intentions as opposed to mere concrete forms of 
behaviour,  who recognise the necessity of critical self-evaluation, and 
who understand the over-riding value of communication between persons 
•  all  of  which  are  characteristic of  what  might  be  referred   to  as 
principled  thought. 
 
With regard  to the first three predicted qualitative  changes which can be 
presumed  to result as a function of an increase in perspective taking· 
capacity,  therefore,   one   would   anticipate  that  if Philosophy  for 
Children  in  fact enhances  participants'  perspective-taking capacities, 
they ought  to demonstrate a movement away from the primary position of 
self-protection,  through  conformity,  toward  higher  moral  thought. Since 
conformity stands mid-way between the two poles, and since pre- dictions 
with regard to conformity would vary depending  on the initial position of 
the subjects, this study only attempted  to measure movement with respect 
to the two extreme poles, i.e., the degree to which subjects exhibited  
self·protective  attitudes in comparison principled  thought. The specific 
prediction  was that if Philosophy  for Children indeed  en- hances  
participants' capacity  and  propensity for  perspective-taking, they ought 
to demonstrate a decrease in self-protective  attitudes and an increase in 
principled thought. 
Besides the sequential qualitative progression which corresponds to, but is 
not dependent  upon, independent  theories of moral and ego develop· 
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ment, one can argue that an increase in perspective • taking capacity can 
also be expected  to (i) increase tolerance for ambiguity, {ii)  decrease 
concern over external cues, and (iii) increase in an individual's self·es- 
teem.. 
 
Individuals who perceive an issue from only one point of view, perceive 
issues  as  relatively  unambiguous:  things  are either  black or  white 
(there is no grey); either you are for me or against me; either you are 
right or wrong. Martin and Westie 13  describe individuals who are in- 
tolerant of ambiguity as tending to perceive dimensionalised stimuli as 
absolutely dichotomised,  to seek unambiguous  solutions for complex 
problems, and  to demonstrate  rigid categorical thinking. Given  that 
participants  in a Community  of Inquiry are chronically and  inevitably 
exposed to multiple points of view, one would predict that, after long 
term experience, members would develop an ever higher tolerance for 
ambiguity defined quite literally as the opposite of tending to view is- 
sues from only one clear but unambiguous perspective at a time.
14  
This 
prediction  reflects the work of Harvard  Psychologist William Perry 
15 
who reported  that, as students became progressively enriched by their 
studies at University, they moved progressively farther away from the 
initial  position  rigidly  categorical  thinking,  through  radical  relativ- 
ity, to finally begin able to make reflective judgements about the ade- 
quacy of varying perspectives. 
 
Perspective-taking is not literal: one can not actually see another  per- 
son's point of view. One can only imagine it (presumably more of less ac- 
curately depending  upon the communicative opportunities and capaci- 
ties of relevant individuals).  In contradistinction to external represen- 
tations, i.e., cues that are publicly perceivable (e.g., the chocolate cook- 
ies that are sitting  on  the counter  for all to see), the imagined  view 
points of others can be described as internal representations. On the as· 
sumption  that both kinds of perceptual cues influence behaviour, it can 
be theorised that an increase in perspective taking, i.e., an increase in 
internal cues, will result in a corresponding increase in the behavioural 
influence of those cues.  Given that Philosophy  for Children  is theorised to 
enhance participants' perspective-taking capacity, one would predict that 
exposure to Philosophy for Children  ought to result in a decrease in the 
behavioural influence  of external cues, i.e., subjects  ought  to become 
less externally oriented. 
 
With regard  to an individual's  self·esteem, all of the variables men- 
tioned thus far can be presumed to have an impact.  An individual who 
is self-protective, i.e., who is preoccupied with control due to a dim un- 
derstanding of the intentions of others, can be expected to have a precar- 
ious  self-esteem,  particularly  when  exposed  to complex situations. 
Similarly, individuals  who are intolerant of ambiguity, since they per- 
ceive novelty, and insolubility as threatening, and since this in turn re- 
sults-- according to Martin and Westie16 - in such responses as repres- 
sion, denial, anxiety, discomfort, destructive and avoidance behaviour, 
can also be presumed  to have a less than optimal self--esteem, again 
particularly in complex situations.  On the other hand, individuals  who 
are able to understand complex issues from multiple points of view and 
who  receive positive social feedback as a result of  making decisions 
that are perceived by others as "moral," can be expected to have a rela- 
tively robust self-esteem.  Similarly, individuals who are internally, as 
opposed  to externally,  oriented  ought  to feel that  they are  more  a 
product of themselves than puppets at the mercy of external cues, and 
hence ought to exhibit a more secure self--esteem.  For all these reasons, 
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due to a decrease in self-protective attitudes, an increased tolerance for 
ambiguity, an increase in the propensity  to utilise principled thought, 
and a decrease in external orientation, therefore, one would expect that 
increasing  differentiation ought  to result in a relatively more robust 
self-esteem. 
 
In   summary  then, since long  term  participation  in a Community of 
Inquiry continuously and consistently requires participants to view issues 
from  multiple  perspectives, one  would  predict  that  this experience 
ought to result in  (prediction 1) a decrease in attitudes characteristic of 
low moral development (self-protective) and (prediction 2) an increase 
in principled thought. One would also expect (prediction 3) an increased 
tolerance for ambiguity (corresponding to an increased comfort with 
seeing issues through multiple perspectives); (prediction 4) a decrease in 
external orientation (due to an increase in internal representations); and 
(prediction 5)  an increase in self-esteem corresponding  to all of the 






This research was carried out at a private school
17 
in West Vancouver, 
British   Columbia, Canada,  which   had   undertaken  to  institute 
Philosophy  for Children  in all its primary  grades from kindergarten  to 
grade 5. All teachers underwent an extensive 80 hour P4C training pro- 
gram  under the direction of the author.   The plan was to do a control 
study  of the students  nearing completion of the fifth grade before P4C 
was instituted  (i.e., in 1994) 
18  
and  then to test students  at the end of 
grade 5 in each subsequent year for the next several years so as to mea- 
sure  the cumulative  impact  of participating in the Philosophy for 
Children program.   The data  presented  here shows the results of the 
first 2 years of the study (1995, 1996). 
 
It ought to be noted at this juncture that the overall numbers are small: 
the control group had 50 subjects, the 1 year group had 37 subjects, the 2 
year group had 38 subjects (subjects who did not complete all the parts of 
the more extensive research project were eliminated).  From a statistical 
point of view, such small numbers make the possibility of recording real 
differences between groups  proportionately more difficult.   However, 
given the rare occurrence of having a school instituting P4C throughout 
aU its grades, all at the same time, made this experimental opportunity 
too good to pass up. 
 
Measurement tools 
A questionnaire was devised that consisted of 50 randomly interspersed 
statements  taken from other questionnaires  already checked for valid 
ity  and  reliability  (see Appendix).    Subjects  were asked  to indicate 
their degree of agreement or disagreement  to each of these statements 
using a 9 point scale: 1 indicating strong agreement; 9 indicating strong 
disagreement. 
 
The questionnaire consisted of 20 self-esteem  statements  which them- 
selves were divided into 5 subsets (as it was theorised that situational 
contingencies  might result  in self-esteem  itself being a multi-dimen- 
sional variable, e.g., one's attitude  about one's  body or family experi- 
ence might be immune to the otherwise  positive benefits of Philosophy 
for Children). All of  these  were  taken  from  the  Murray,  Holroyd, 
Harrington  Test for Self-Esteem for Children 19 . The self-esteem  state- 
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ments consisted of 4 designed  to measure global self-esteem (e.g., "I'm 
happy  the way I am"); 4 that focused on academic  self-esteem (e.g., " 
I'm proud of the work that I do in school"); 4 designed to measure bodily 
self-esteem (e.g., "I like the way I look"); 4 that focused on family  (e.g., 
"I'm an important  member of my family"); and 4 that looked at social 
self-esteem (e.g., "I feel good about myself when I am with my friend"). 
 
Ten statements  were included  to measure external  orientation. Since 
subjects in this study  were children, 5 of these were adapted  from the 
Nowicki, Strickland Test for Locus of Control 
20 
to measure external ori- 
entation with respects to parents  in particular (e.g., "It is nearly impos- 
sible to change my parents  minds about anything").   The 5 remaining 
were taken from the originally designed questionnaire to  asure exter- 
nal orientation in general (e.g., " When 90Jne01le doesn't like me, there is 
little that I can do about it"). 
 
The remainder of the questionnaire consisted of 5 self-protective  state- 
ments (e.g., "Never  tell anyone  why you did something  unless it will 
help you")  taken from the Christie Kiddie Mach questionnaire21; 5 de- 
signed to measure intolerance to ambiguity (e.g., "A person either knows 
the answer  to a question  or he doesn't") taken from the Martin and 
Westie Intolerance of Ambiguity questionnaire22
 
5 designed to measure
 
; 
social values  heretofore  referred to as principled thought (e.g., 
"Individuals should  feel responsible  for helping others to be moral"). 
The Social Values items were taken from the Perloe's Social Values 
Questionnaire though slightly  modified to increase comprehensibility 
for the young subjects.  A 5 item lie scale, taken from Murry et. al. Self- 
Esteem Questionnaire was also included. The inclusion of a lie scale was 
considered  important  as a measure of whether subjects who answered 
high on the social values questions might be doing so more as a function 
of a wish to produce socially acceptable responses than what subjects ac- 
tually believed (e.g., "I always go to bed without complaining when it is 
bedtime"). 
 
Method of analysis 
Where necessary, scales of individual  items were transposed  so that 
high scores on the final grouped  statements indicated the presence of 
the relevant characteristic  (i.e., a high score on the group  designed  to 
measure  a self-protective  attitude  indicated  that  that individual  was 
relatively self-protective}. Total scores were computed for each set and 
subset:  self-protective  (self-pro); intolerance  to ambiguity  (intol.  to 
amb.); general external orientation  (extern); external orientation  with 
respect  to patents  (parent); social values (values): the lie scale (lie); 
and  self-esteem (global; family; social; academic; body).  Each state- 
ment  was correlated  (Pearson  r) with the total score of the group  to 
which it belonged.  These item-total correlations served as a guide in 
evaluating  the internal  validity  of each statement  in the group.    All 
statements correlated  with their parent group at a significance level of 
12.-<.001. 
 
The mean scores for each variable was then computed  for the control 
group  (1994) as well as the groups  who had participated  in the P4C 
program  for 1 year (1995) and  for 2 years (1996) T-tests were done  to 
measure whether or not there was a significant difference between the 
means of all three groups, i.e., between the control and the 1 year group; 
between the 1 year and 2 year group; and between the control and the 2 
year group. 
 




Table 1 presents the results of the analysis.  The "significance columns" 
indicate  the degree to which the difference between the means is 
significant.   The highlighted cells between  the "mean columns" show 
the degree of significance between adjacent year.  The highlighted rows 
indicate  the significant difference between  the 1994 control group  and 
the group who participated  in 2 years of P4C, i.e., it indicates  a 
cumulative effect.  A significance  level  of  "000"  indicates  that  the 
chances of the difference between  the means occurring as a result of 
chance is so small that the computer could no compute it. The last column 







Table 1 shows that the measures used were able to track a number of the 
qualitative  changes in reasoning styles that were predicted  to occur in 
subjects as a result of participating  in Philosophy   for Children. 
 
Prediction 1 
To begin with, it shows a significant drop  in the mean scores for self- 
protective attitudes after one year of participating  in the P4C program, 
with a continuing significant drop  after  the second year.   The control 
group's mean score was 20.2; the 1 year group's scores was 16.4, while the 
2 year score was 13.7. 
 
Prediction 2 
The scores on the social values variable did  not increase after the first 
year but did show a significant increase for the 2 year group.   As there 
was no difference in the lie scores over the 2 year period, this serves as 
evidence  that the higher score on the social values variable was not a 
function of participants  merely wishing to produce socially acceptable 
 
 
Critical efr Creative %inKing  o/o{ 6 f}{o 1 'March. 1998 
o/o{ 6 No 1 Marcft 1998 Criticaf & Creative rrliinKit!JJ 
 
Susan Gardner:       Report on a two year study                                                                          8 
 
responses.  The score on the social values variable for the control group 
was 27.2, while the mean score for the 2 year group  was 32.1. 
 
Prediction 3 
There  was a significant  drop  in intolerance to ambiguity after  1 year, 
with a continuing drop which  increased  in significance  after  2 years. 
The mean score for the control group was 24.8, the mean score for the 1 
year group was 20.3, the mean score for the 2 year group was 17.9. It 
should  be noted  that these drops are all the more impressive given  the 
initial position of the control group, i.e., these children  - to begin  with - 
were not highly intolerant  of ambiguity. 
 
Prediction 4 
The general external orientation  variable did not show any change  until 
the second year.  The mean score for the control group was 16.6, for the 1 
year group  was 17, while for the 2 year group it was 13.7. There was no 
change at all on the variable  which attempted to measure external 
orientation with  respect  to patents.  Again  it is of  note  that  subjects 
started off with a low score on both these variables to begin with. 
 
Prediction S 
With regard  to the self-esteem subsets,  there was a significant  increase 
in family self esteem  aftet  the first year  with a modest  continuing in- 
crease after the second year.  The mean score for the control group was 
26.5, for the 1 year group it was 29.7, for the 2 year group it was 30.2. 
There  was  an  increase  in  global  self-esteem  after  the 1 year  period 
which continued  to become significant after the 2 year period.  The mean 
score for the control group was 24.9, for the 1 year group it was 27.1, for 
the 2 year  group it was 28.3.  There  was no significant  change  in  the 
other subsets of self-esteem.  Again it should be noted that these subjects 
began  with  relatively  high scores on self-esteem:   all scores  were  well 
above  the mid-point. 
 
DISCUSSION 
It was argued  earlier  that since long term participation in a Community 
of Inquiry continuously and consistently  requires participants to view is- 
sues from multiple  perspectives, one would  predict that this experience 
ought  to result in  (prediction 1) a decrease in attitudes characteristic of 
low moral development (self-protective)  and (prediction 2) an increase 
in principled thought.  One would also expect (prediction 3) an increased 
tolerance  for ambiguity (corresponding to an  increased  comfort  with 
seeing issues thought  multiple perspectives); (prediction 4) a decrease in 
external  orientation (due  to an increase in internal  representations; and 
(prediction 5) an  increase  in self-esteem  corresponding to all  of  the 
above. 
 
The questionnaire used, though carrying  with it many of the disadvan- 
tages of a structured instrument (e.g., structured questionnaires impose 
constructs upon respondents that may not be relevant to them outside the 
test situation), itself  received  some  measure  of validity  from  the  fact 
that  the significant  differences in the mean  scores between  the control 
group and  the 2 experimental groups  were all in the direction  predicted. 
Scores on self-protection, intolerance for ambiguity, and general external 
orientation decreased as  expected; while  scores  on  the  social  values 
variable  increased.   There was also an increase in subjects' overall  self- 
esteem,  as well as  their self-esteem  relative  to the family.   It could  be 
hypothesised that  the latter  might  be a result  of an  increase  in inter- 
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personal communication that  families  often  experience as a result  of 
having  a child  engage  in  Philosophy   for Children. 
 
The study  failed to measure a significant  difference  in two areas  where 
change waspredicted: external orientation with respect  to parents,  and 
remaining  subsets of self-esteem.  This lack of significant difference may 
be due  to: a) the fact that P4C did  not have a significant  impact in these 
areas; b) a failure on the part of the instrument used to pick up changes 
(note  that  the  "parent external  orientation" was  constructed for  this 
study and  hence  had  not  been  previously validated); c) the fact  that 
these  youngsters had such  relatively low and  high scores  respectively 
to begin with which gave them very little room for movement; or d) any 
combination of the above. 
 
Nonetheless, the results are  impressive.   The fact that  predicted 
qualitative changes  were empirically measurable despite the inherent 
short-comings of  the structured questionnaire, and  despite the 
statistically small  number of subj cts, and  despite the privileged 
background  of  the  subjects   which   left   relatively  little   room   for 
movement, lends  enormous credence to the already overwhelming 
theoretical support  for  the  claim   that  Philosophy   for Children helps 
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"WHAT DO I THINK" QUESTIONNAIRE. 
 
I AGREE I DISAGREE 
1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7--------8--------9 
 
1. (16) I'm proud of the work I do in school. 
2. (IV4) First impressions are very important. 
3. (119) When someone doesn't like me, there is very little I can do about 
it. 
4. (17) I feel good about myself when I am at school. 
5. (V2) Things work best when people concern themselves with their 
own  welfare and let others  take care of themselves. 
6. (117) When people are mean to me it is usually for no good reason at 
all. 
7.{115) I'm a good daughter/son. 
8. (Hit) Never tell anyone  why you did something unless it will help 
you. 
9. (IV) There is only one right way to do anything. 
10. (I12) I would like to look like somebody else. 
11. (VI4) I get angry  when my parents won't let me do something  that I 
really want to do. 
12. (12) I'm an interesting person. 
13. (Ili4) Most people won't  work hard unless you make them do it. 
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14. (Il4) It is nearly impossible to change my parents mind about 
anything. 
15. (120) I'm lonely. 
16. (V3) Individuals should feel responsible  for helping others  to be 
moral. 
17. (VIS) I brush  my teeth after every meal. 
18. (116) I think my parents would be happy  if I were a lot different. 
19. (litO) Planning  ahead makes things tum out better. 
20. (I10) I would like my weight to be different. 
21. (112) Most of the time parents  listen to what their children  have  to 
say. 
22. (IV2) A person either knows an answer to a question or she doesn't. 
23. (117) Other  kids make me feel like I'm not good enough. 
24. (V4) Some of life's greatest satisfactions are found  working 
cooperatively with  others. 
25. (Vl2) If I get mad at a friend, I might call him or her a name. 
26. (13) I'm happy  with the way I am.. 
27. (IVl) There are two kinds of people in the world: the weak and  the 
strong. 
28. (113) When I get punished, it is usually for no good reason. 
29.(118) I'm dumb at school work. 
30. (Il8) It is useless to try and get my own way at home. 
31. (111) I have a nice smile. 
32. (Vl3) I always go to bed without complaining when it is bedtime. 
33. (III5) It's better  to tell someone why you want her to help you than 
to make up a good story to get her to do it. 
34. (114) I make my parents  unhappy. 
35. (Vll) lt doesn't bother me when I lose a game. 
36. (119) I feel good about myself when I am with my friends. 
37. (l5) I'm disappointed with my school grades. 
38.(V5) It is wrong to point it out if somebody does something  wrong. 
39. (118) My friends listen to my ideas. 
40. (Vl)  A person should  not be respected for her achievements if they 
were obtained  by interfering with the welfare of others. 
41. (IV3) You can classify almost all people as either honest or crooked. 
42. (14) I'm not good at things. 
43. (liS) When I do something  wrong, there is little I can do to make it 
right. 
44. (III2) It is smartest  to believe that all people  will be mean if they 
have  a chance. 
45. (113) I'm an important member of my family. 
46. (116)  Whether or not people like me depends upon how I act. 
47. (III3) Sometimes you have to hurt other people to get what you want 
48. (11) I wish I were somebody  else. 
49. (111) Most of the time it doesn't pay to try hard because things never 
tum out right anyway. 
50. (19) I like the way I look. 
 
 
"WHAT DO I THINK" QUESTIONNAIRE taken from the following:- 
 
I. SELF-ESTEEM 
(Murray,  Holroyd,  Harrington test for self-esteem  for children) 
Global  scale 
48 (11). I  wish I  were somebody  else.(-) 
12 ([2). I'm an interesting person. 
26 (I3). I'm happy with the way I am. 
42 (14). I'm not good at things. H 
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Academic  Scale 
37 (IS) I'm disappointed with my school grades (-) 
1 (16) I'm proud of the work I do at school. 
4   (17) I feel good about  myself when I am at school. 
29 (18) I'm  dumb at school work.(-) 
 
Body Scale 
50 (19) I like the way I look. 
20 (IlO) I would like my weight to be different(-) 
31 (Ill) I have a nice smile 
10 (112) I would like to look like somebody else.(-) 
 
Family  Scale 
45 (113) I'm an important member of my family. 
34 (114) I make my parents unhappy (-) 
7  (115) I'm a good daughterIson. 
18 (116) I think my parents  would be happy if I were a lot different. (-) 
 
Social  Scale 
23 (117) Other kids make me feel like I'm not good enough.(.) 
39 (118) My friends listen to my ideas. 
36 (I19) I feel good about  myself when I am with my friends. 
15 (120) I'm  lonely. H 
 
 
II.  EXTERNAL ORIENTATION   (An adaptation of the Nowicki, 
Strickland test for locus of control for children.) 
A- Parents 
21(II2)Most of the time parents  listen to what their children  have  to 
say(-) 
28 (113) When I get punished, it is usually for no good reason. 
14 (II4) It is nearly impossible to change my parents' mind about 
anything. 
30 (li8)It is useless to try and get my own way at home. 




49 (Ill) Most of the time it doesn't pay to try hard because things never 
tum out right anyway. 
46 (116)  Whether or not people like me depends  upon how I act. (-) 
6   (Il7) When people are mean to me it is usually for no good reason at 
a II. 
3    (119) When someone doesn't like me, there is very little I can do about 
it; 
19  (IIlO) Planning ahead  makes things turn out better.(-) 
 
 
III. SELF-PROTECTIVE ATTITUDE 
(from  the Chrisitie Kiddie  Mach <Machiavellianism>) 
8   (llll) Never tell anyone  why you did something unless it will help 
you. 
44 (III2)  It is smartest  to believe that all people will be mean if they 
have a chance. 
47 (Ill3) Sometimes  you have to hurt other people to get what you want. 
13 (Ill4)  Most people won't  work hard unless you make them do it. 
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33 (IllS) It's better to tell someone why you want her to help you than to 
make up a good story to get her to do it. (-) 
 
 
IV. INTOLERANCE OF AMBis:;UITY  (from Martin and Westie) 
27 OV1) There are two kinds of people in the world: the weak and the 
Str{)ng. 
22 (IV2 A person either knowsan answer to a question or he doesn't. 
41 IV3) You can classify almost all people as either honest or crooked. 
2   (IV4)  First impressions are very important. 




(an adaptation of  Perloe's Social Values Questionnaire) 
40 {V1) A person should  not be respected for her achievements if they 
were obtained  by interfering with the welfare of others. 
5  (V2) Things work best when people concern themselves  with their 
own  welfare and  let others  take care of themselves. ( ) 
16 (V3) Individuals should feet responsible for helping others  to be 
moral. 
24 (V4 )Some of life's greatest satisfactions are found working 
cooperatively with  others. 
38 (VS) It is wrong to point it out if somebody does something  wrong.(-) 
 
 
LIE SCALE (From the self esteem scale) 
35 (VIl) It doesn't bother me when I lose a game. 
25 (Vl2) If I get mad at a friend, I might call him or her a name.(-) 
32 (VI3) I always go to bed without complaining when it is bedtime. 
11 (Vl4 ) I get angry when my parents won't let me do something that I 
really want  to do.. (-) 





Switch:1; 2; 3; 4; 6; 7;8; 9; 12; 13; 14; 16; 17; 22; 24; 26; 27; 28; 30; 31; 32; 35; 
36;39;40;41;43;44;45;47;49;5(). 
1=9; 2=8; 3=7; 4=6; 6=4; 7=3;8=2; 9=1. 
